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Abstract—The aim of this study is to investigate 
the determinants of capital structure for 
Malaysian manufacturing companies. The 
studied subjects were 174 Malaysia 
manufacturing companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia from year 2011 to year 2014. Firm 
fixed-effect with robust standard was used in 
data analysis to address the potential 
heterogeneity and endogeneity that arise from 
panel data.  The analysis shows that firm 
profitability and non-debt tax shield are 
negatively related to firm leverage. On the other 
hand, several corporate governance 
mechanisms, namely, ownership concentration, 
separation of CEO-chairs, board independence, 
are not related to firm leverage. Liquidity, firm 
size and asset structure are also not related to 
firm leverage of manufacturing firms. 
Keywords— Capital structure; firm leverage; 
corporate governance; manufacturing firms; 
Malaysia 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The research on capital structure has been 
gaining traction in finance literature since the 
conceptualization of capital structure by 
Modigliani and Miller since 1958. In general, 
capital structure refers to the combination of 
debt and equity, which is to finance firm’s 
long term asset [1]. Capital structure 
represents an important long-term decision 
made by the management team to maximize 
value of firm [2]. Firms’ capital structure is 
closely linked to its financial performance, 
such as returns of assets or equity [3]. 
 
Prior literature largely suggest that capital 
structure can affect the firms’ operation and 
profitability [4]. Many studies on the determinants 
of capital structure are conducted but the findings 
are generally mixed. That is, there is consistent 
findings on the determinants of capital structure 
choice. In this regard, the institutional context or 
single country context play an important role to 
explain the mixed findings. An interesting study by 
Krishnan and Moyer [5] found out that capital 
structure can be depends on the governance 
variables. Meanwhile, current literature also points 
out that capital structure choice is related to firm 
investment, the cost involves and the expected 
returns. This indicates that determinants of capital 
structure may include corporate governance and 
financial variables. 
 
In the case of manufacturing firms, which 
reside in a highly competitive business 
environment, the capital choice could be unique 
due to its nature high firm investment in 
technological assets. The understudied capital 
choice in manufacturing firms in emerging 
economies is thus a very interesting research gap to 
be filled. Thus, this study intends to identify the 
determinants that affect capital structure of 
Malaysian manufacturing firms. 
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2. Theoretical Frameworks 
 
2.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
Information asymmetry happens when a 
company’s internal information, i.e., the 
financial and risk status is not known 
outsiders [6].  Information asymmetry occurs 
when one party is positioned to have better 
information than the others [7]. If the principal 
does not have complete knowledge of what 
the agent’s actions are, this will allow the 
agent to pursue their own interests without 
detection. There are two determinations for 
the level of information asymmetry, which 
includes the extent to which basic common 
knowledge exists between participants and the 
level of coordination or communication 
among team members. 
 
Entrepreneurs have different perceived 
information asymmetry costs that vary with 
firm size [8].  Some may think it is value for 
it, some may not, and this is affected by how 
the information transfers.  This situation 
happens especially when investors of a 
company do not know everything about a 
company and the information reveal by the 
company is limited, this will affect the results 
on estimation of growth opportunities by 
investors.  Hence, outside investors often 
cannot see clearly the internal function of a 
company [9]. The greater the information 
asymmetry, the more uncertain investors will 
be regarding growth predictions [8].  As a 
result, investor will expect for higher premium 
for the risk that they risking.  When the 
premium is too high and the company does 
not have ability to pay it, firms will lower the 
investment.  Firms with high levels of 
intangible assets is also difficult to be valuated 
and the information asymmetry will be larger. 
Consequently, there is less investor willing to 
invest due to the undisclosed information. 
That means the investment for the company 
decline, and it affects the growth rates of the 
company. This is because when a company 
intend to borrow money, the company will be 
publicly observed by the lender [10].  The 
financing would be successful only if lender 
also believes the company can pay back the 
loans. 
 
2.2 Agency Theory 
 
Jensen and Meckling [11] define the agency 
relation as a contract when the principal engages 
another parties, which known as agents, to perform 
firm management. Principals will delegate decision 
making power in firms to the agents.  Agency costs 
incurred due to conflicts of interest between 
principals and agents after power and control are 
given to the agents to control firm’s action [12].  
Agency theory can also be used to explain firm’s 
capital structure which the firm try to minimize the 
cost with the separation of ownership and control 
[13].  That is, lender’s monitoring and controlling 
the firm’s actions also consider as agency cost 
[11].  When managers possess more information of 
the firm in terms of future prospect than investors, 
there will be additional agency cost in the capital 
structure. 
 
Agency theory suggest two type of conflicts: 
(1) conflicts between managers and shareholders 
and (2) conflicts between debt holders and 
shareholders; the latter is known as agency costs of 
debt [11].  The first type of conflicts occur when 
the managers make decision based on own 
preferences, not profit maximization, this will only 
maximizes manager’s own wealth (Berger and Di 
Patti, 2006; Nikolaos et al., 2007).  The second 
type of conflicts occur when shareholders’ priority 
their interests and ignore debtholders’ interest in 
term of honoring the loan payment. 
 
3. Hypotheses Development 
 
Trade-off theory suggest profitability and capital 
structure have positive relationship as higher 
profitability will encourage the use of debt to get 
the tax shield benefits [12].  However, based on 
pecking order theory, it suggests a negative 
relationship between profitability and capital 
structure as profitability is source of internal funds. 
We submitted the following hypothesis for further 
testing. 
 
H1: Profitability has a significant relation to firm 
leverage. 
 
When a firm size is large, then it may bring 
benefits to the company [4]. Larger firms tend be 
more diversified and according to the trade-off 
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theory. Thus, larger firms have less 
probability to go bankruptcy and have lower 
bankruptcy cost, lower agency cost. This is 
because it has less cash flow and will borrow 
more. A firm may also reduce its transaction 
cost when firm size is large as it has effect on 
its capital structure [14]. As the size of firm 
larger, it should able to reduce the information 
asymmetry, risk, cost reduction and it open up 
external finances. Hence, it can increase debt 
levels. As the firm size gets larger, it will have 
larger debt; when the debt is larger, it can act 
as debt finance to reduce the cost in getting 
capital. Thus,  firm size and debt level may 
have positive relationship. Thus: 
 
H2: Firm size has a positive relation to firm 
leverage. 
 
Asset structure is one of the determinants 
in capital structure due to information 
asymmetry [4].  Based on pecking order 
theory, asset is used as collateral and asset 
will decrease the information asymmetry 
effect on the firm.  In order to know the asset 
structure, a formula which fixed assets over 
total assets is used [15].  Some researchers 
like Myers and Majluf [16] and Friend and 
Lang [17] calculate asset structure by using 
intangible assets over the fixed assets.  
Tangible assets can be pledged as collateral 
and thus the larger share of tangible assets in 
the overall asset structure, the higher the 
leverage. 
 
H3: Asset structure has a positive relation to 
firm leverage. 
 
Non-debt tax shield is the substitute of 
the tax shields on debt financing [18].  Hence, 
when a firm has higher non-debt tax shields, it 
will have less debt.  When a firm reports its 
income as low or negative, the tax shield 
benefits will be reduced.  Hence, the firm need 
to pay for heavy interest payment [12]. Thus: 
 
H4: Non-debt tax benefits have a negative 
relation to firm leverage. 
 
According to Nadeem Ahmed and 
Zongjun [12], there is a positive relationship 
between liquidity and leverage as trade-off 
theory state that firm with high liquidity ratio could 
borrow more.  However, pecking theory says that 
when a firm have greater liquidity, it will prefer to 
generate fund internally compare with externally.  
Hence, there is a negative relationship between 
liquidity and leverage. Thus: 
 
H5: Liquidity has a positive relation firm leverage. 
 
Ownership concentration is used to define the 
percentages of voting rights by shareholders.  The 
shareholders could be included directors, firm’s 
officers, family members and individuals [19].  In 
ownership concentrations, the voting right is held 
by largest shareholders.  To achieve effective 
control on the firms, controlling shareholders have 
to concentrate on ownership to influence the long-
term strategies of the firm.  This situation can 
resolve the differences of interest between 
shareholders and firm management. The 
concentration ownership able to provide powerful 
incentives to major shareholders, and they will be 
the controlling shareholders, but when the 
interested are not divided perfectly, it also may 
cause conflicts between the controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders.  Thus, it 
can be expected that a high ownership concentrated 
structure and lead to high level of debts because it 
can increase the return on equity holders, 
especially the largest shareholders. 
 
H6: Ownership concentration has a positive 
relation to firm leverage. 
 
Board independence indicates the ratio of 
independent directors to total board memberships.  
A firm is delegating the monitoring services to 
independent professional to ensure the firm’s 
corporate disclosure at a quality level.  A people 
who are lack of independence could not perform 
close monitoring.  The proportion of outside 
representatives of shareholders on board will have 
influence on the de facto powers of owner-
managers [20].  Board independence is generally 
effective to monitor top management [21]. If good 
board governance exists, the boards should opt an 
optimal capital structure to increase firm returns. 
Thus, it can be expected good governance boards 
will opt a high level of debts in the firm to increase 
higher return on shareholders. 
 
H7: Board independence has a positive relation to 
228 
Vol. 7, No. 3, June, 2018 Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt 
 
firm leverage. 
 
It is possible that the chief executive 
officer (CEO) is also the chair of the board of 
director for a firm [21]. The separation of 
CEO-chairs means that the CEO is not serve 
as board chairperson [22].  According to 
agency theory, if the CEO is also the chair of 
board of director, it will bring strong 
individual power base and weaken the board 
independence. The separation of CEO-chairs 
can be considered a form of good board 
governance. Thus, it can be expected 
separation of CEO-chairs will opt a high level 
of debts in the firm to increase higher return 
on shareholders. 
 
H8: Separation of CEO-chairs has a positive 
relation to firm leverage. 
 
4. Methods 
 
The data for are 184 Malaysian manufacturing 
companies are collected between year 2011 to 
2014. All the data is collected from annual 
reports published in website of Bursa 
Malaysia and financial data from DataStream. 
After the data screening, there are 174 
companies to be used in this study, which 
contributes to 94.57% of valid sample. The 
research model is shown as below whereas the 
table 1 explains the measures of variables. 
 
Cap. St = β0 + β1 owncon1 + β2 sCEO + β3 
BoaID + β4 Pro + β5 Fsize + β6 Asset.s + β7 
ndts + β8 Liq + Ԑ0 
 
Table 1. Measure 
 
Variable 
(Notation) 
Measure 
Capital 
Structure (Cap. 
St) 
Total Debt / Total Assets 
Ownership 
concentration 
(owncon1) 
The percentages of voting rights 
by the largest shareholders 
Separation of 
CEO-chairs 
(sCEO) 
If CEO is not serve as board 
chairperson, the value will be ‘1’ 
and if CEO is serve as board 
chairman, the value will be ‘0’ 
Board 
independence 
Ratio of independent directors to 
total board memberships 
(BoaID) 
Profitability 
(Pro) 
Pretax income / Total Asset 
Firm size 
(Fsize) 
Net Sales 
Asset structure 
(Asset.s) 
Fixed Asset (Property, plant, 
equipment) / Total Asset 
Non-debt tax 
shield (ndts) 
Interest Expenses on Debt 
Liquidity (liq) Current Asset / Current Liabilities 
 
5. Findings and Discussion 
 
In this study, we used firm-fixed effect regression 
with robust standard errors to perform causal 
analysis of determinants on capital structure. Firm-
fixed effect not only eliminate heterogeneity in the 
panel data but also mitigate the potential 
endogeneity issue. Table 2 shows the regression 
estimation results for the firm’s capital structure. 
 
 
Table 2. Regression results 
 
Load time Coefficient (Z Value) 
Ownership 
Concentration 
-0.0004 (-1.27) 
Separation of CEO-
Chairs 
0.0126 (0.94) 
Board Independence 0.0104 (0.26) 
Profitability -0.0719*** (-2.97) 
Firm Size 0.0000 (-0.44) 
Asset Structure 0.0271** (2.41) 
Non-debt Tax Shield 0.0000*** (3.78) 
Liquidity ratio -0.0019 (-1.69) 
Constant 0.0804 (3.23) 
Note: **/*** denotes significant at 0.05 / 0.01 
level  
 
It is important to note that firm profitability 
has a negative and significant impact on the firm 
leverage. This result is consistent with study of 
pecking order theory [12]. It supports that a firm 
prefer to generate funds internally compare with 
debt and external financing. It also consistent with 
several studies[14, 23], which they found there is 
negative relationship between profitability and 
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capital structure. These findings imply that an 
increase in profitability is associated with a 
decrease in capital structure. On the other 
hand, the results of non-debt tax benefits have 
a positive relation to capital structure but the 
effect is marginal. It seems that larger non-
debt tax shield is not an important criterion for 
firms’ capital structure decisions. Liquidity 
ratio is negatively related to capital structure 
which is consistent with pecking order theory. 
That is, if a firm have lower liquidity, it will 
prefer to generate fund externally through 
borrowing. Finally, asset structure was found 
to have a positive impact on capital structure. 
This supports the pecking order theory that 
larger share of tangible assets in the overall 
asset structure will result in higher leverage. 
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